We investigate the impact of bank competition on the use of collateral in loan contracts. We develop a theoretical model incorporating information asymmetries in a spatial competition framework where banks choose between screening the borrower and asking collateral. We show that presence of collateral is more likely when bank competition is lower. We then test empirically this prediction on a sample of bank loans from 70 countries. We perform logit regressions of the presence of collateral on bank competition, measured by the Lerner index. Our empirical tests corroborate the theoretical predictions of a negative role of bank competition on the presence of collateral. These findings survive several robustness checks.
Introduction
Following the significant structural changes of the banking industry witnessed around the globe, much theoretical and empirical work has examined the economic role of bank competition in recent years. 1 The impact of bank competition on the access to bank finance has notably been investigated, as benefits from bank competition are intuitively expected from lower loan rates which should favor this access (e.g. Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004).
Nevertheless, the role of bank competition on the access to bank finance is also dependent on its effects on collateral use, as collateral requirements are repeatedly We can thus point out that theoretical literature provides conflicting predictions which lack of empirical tests to their validation. The aim of this paper is to provide a broad and consistent analysis of the role of bank competition on the use of collateral, based on theoretical and empirical investigation. We then test empirically our theoretical predictions with a cross-country analysis on a sample of 4931 bank loans from 70 countries. By performing a crosscountry analysis, we do not rely to on a single country for our study which may lead to country-specific results. We perform logit regressions of the presence of collateral on bank competition. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the theoretical model. In section III, we develop the empirical results. We finally provide some concluding remarks in section IV.
II. Theoretical model

II.1 Set up of the model
Before analyzing the credit contracts offered, we describe the characteristics of the firms possibly applying for a loan and the banking sector. The total mass of firms is normalized to 1. Firms are distributed uniformly around a circle of length 1.
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The share of good firms is µ and that of bad firms is (1-µ). The good firms have a project that is successful with probability p. In the case of success the project's payoff is X, in the case of failure it is 0. The investment costs of the project are I. Thus, the expected payoff of a good firm is pX-I>0, which we assume to be positive. Bad firms will fail with probability 1. If they receive a loan, they take the money and run. Due to the lack of own liquid funds, the firms need to finance their investment through credit. The firm's owners are endowed with an asset A that can potentially be offered as collateral.
We consider a banking sector with N identical banks that are located equidistantly around the circle. Banks cannot observe the firm's type, i.e. whether a particular firm is good or bad. However, they know the distribution of good and bad firms. Moreover, banks can observe the firm's location. They compete in repayments.
We assume that banks possess enough funds to finance all firms that apply for loans and that the firms' returns (and in the case of collateralization their assets) are high enough such that the market is covered.
Banks have two means to discriminate between good and bad firms: they either offer a collateralized credit contract which induces firms to signal their type, or they screen all firms applying for credit by evaluating their credit proposals. In the case of collateralization, the bank gets a payoff from the collateralized assets that are liquidated if the project fails. There are costs associated with liquidation. Therefore, the liquidation value of each unit of collateral, denoted by α, is lower than the continuation value of the firm, i.e., α < 1.
If banks decide to screen, they receive a signal about a firm's creditworthiness.
If the firm is good, the bank always gets the signal that the firm is good. However, if the firm is bad, the bank's signal is correct only with probability s(d) > 0.5. Note that offering a contract without either screening or collateralization does not pay off because we assume that µpX-I<0.
The timing of the game is as follows: In the first stage, banks decide simultaneously which type of contract they offer. In the second stage, the banks determine simultaneously the terms of the credit contract they offer. Firms apply at the bank which offers the contract with the most favourable terms. If banks offer the same rate, firms apply at the closest bank (due to the application costs).
To render the analysis as clear as possible we make three simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that banks are not allowed to price-discriminate, i.e.
they cannot make the terms of the loan contract dependent on the firm's location. This assumption allows deriving the same contract terms for all firms and therefore avoids that we have to give repayments for each individual firm. 5 Second, the banks do not 3 Lehner and Schnitzer (2008) use the same setup in which the signal is imperfect for bad firms. 4 In Hauswald and Marquez (2006) , the quality of the screening signal depends on the distance between banks and borrowers as well. Empirical evidence also shows that different banks rate obtain different results from screening a particular borrower (Jacobson, Lindé and Roszbach, 2006; Mitchell and van Roy, 2007) . This is consistent with our setup. 5 It also implies that firms do not face a hold-up problem and therefore their payoffs are higher (except for the marginal firm). If the hold-up problem existed, firms would find the screening contract less incur any costs per customer for performing the creditworthiness test. This cost would only add an additional term in each repayment function but would not change the insights obtained. The costs we want to emphasize are the losses the bank faces when it erroneously provides a loan to a bad firm. Third, we assume that firms apply at the closest bank if banks offer the same repayments. We would obtain the same qualitative result if firm's had to incur some cost of application.
We solve the game by backward induction. Thus, we first analyse the contract terms for a situation in which both banks offer either a collateralized or a screening contract. In a second step, we show that it is indeed optimal for the banks to offer the same type of contract.
II.2 Collateralized credit contract
We first suppose that all banks offer a collateralized credit contract.
Collateralization implies that the firm repays an amount R L in the case of success and that it loses collateral in the amount L in the case of failure. The credit contract has to be designed in a way that the bad firms have no incentive to demand credit. This is reached through collateralization. The incentive compatibility constraint for a bad firm can be written as:
If a bad firm receives a loan in the amount of I (and runs away with the money), it will lose assets in the amount of L as the project fails with certainty. Therefore, it is obvious that the amount of collateral that prevents bad firms from applying for credit is I. As a result, bad firms do not apply for loans. Moreover, given that from (IC.F_L) L=I, the participation constraint of the good firm must hold:
If the project is successful, a good firm repays R L from the payoff X it generates.
In the case of failure, collateralized assets in the amount of I are seized by the bank.
The expected payoff when the investment is credit-financed has to be at least as high as the payoff from not investing.
attractive relative to the collateralized contract. The insights from our model would not change, only the parameter ranges in which a particular contract is optimal.
The bank will participate if it makes at least zero expected profit with the contract offered. The bank's expected profit by each (good) firm is given by
which implies that it needs a repayment of at least L R . The collateralized credit contract is described in the following lemma:
With a collateralized contract, all banks demand
as a repayment and demand collateral L=I.
Proof: See the Appendix A.
Perfect competition between banks maximizes the marginal firm's expect payoff. As a result, banks make zero expected profits.
II.3 Screening contract
We next suppose that all banks offer a screening contract. With a screening contract, the banks will screen out the bad firms with probability s ( ( )
The firm must be better off by being able to realize the project and generate a return X and repay R S than by not investing and getting the outside option of A.
The bank's participation constraint is given by
Thus, the bank will offer loans only if the expected repayment it gets from good firms is high enough to compensate the losses it makes with financing the (marginal) 8 8 bad firm k. The marginal firm is the firm that the bank is financing and is furthest away from the bank. The repayment the bank needs to break even is denoted by S R .
Lemma 2:
With a screening contract, all banks demand
repayment from all firms with a positive signal. The marginal firm k is the firm that is located half-way between two banks.
Since all banks demand the same repayment in equilibrium, firms apply for loans at the closest bank. We assume that if both banks ask the same repayment, firms apply at the closest bank. Hence, all banks have the same market share and the marginal firm k is located half-way between two banks. Due to competition banks offer repayments that maximize the firm's expected payoff.
II.4 Comparison of contracts
A firm is indifferent between the two contracts (derived in Lemma 1 and 2) if its expected profits from both contracts are the same, i.e. if the firm obtains the same profit with a collateralized and a screening contract ( )
Having derived this threshold value, we can state the following proposition: 
Proposition 2:
It is more likely that a contract is collateralized if the less competition there is in the banking sector, i.e. N is lower.
Collaterization becomes more likely if it gets cheaper relative to screening.
Therefore, it is quite clear that collateralization is chosen more often if the liquidation value increases. Screening becomes more efficient if the quality of the screening signal increases. Then, the banks make fewer mistakes in the evaluation of credit proposals and therefore have lower costs in form of non-repayments. The quality of the screening signal depends on two factors: the screening technology as such and the distance between bank and firm. The distance between bank and firm is determined by the degree of bank competition. If there are more banks in the market (and by assumption they are located equidistantly), the distance between banks is lower and so is the distance between bank and firm. Distance influences the degree of asymmetric information between firm and bank. The closer a firm is located to the bank, the more informed is the bank, and more precise is the screening signal. Thus, with more banks the distance between the marginal firm and the bank decreases. The quality of the screening signal is higher and thus the repayment the bank needs to break-even is lower.
III. Empirical evidence
The theoretical model shows that greater bank competition lowers collateral requirements. We now bring empirical evidence to bear on this issue. We first describe data and variables, before explaining how we measure bank competition. We then develop the empirical results.
III.1. Data and variables
The sample of bank loans is obtained from the Dealscan database, which is The explained variable is the presence of collateral, which is measured by a dummy variable (Collateral) equal to one if the loan is secured and to zero if it is not.
The explanatory variable of primary concern is the Lerner index (Lerner Index), measuring bank competition. We use the mean Lerner index for each country. Its computation is described in the next subsection. Bank-level data are taken from the "Bankscope" database of BVD-IBCA.
We use 5 loan-level control variables to take loan characteristics into account.
These include information on loan maturity (Maturity), and on the type of loan, which is controlled through a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is a term loan and otherwise to zero Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in table 2.
III.2 The measurement of bank competition
Empirical research on the measurement of bank competition provides several tools, which can be divided into the traditional Industrial Organization (IO) and the new empirical IO approaches. The traditional IO approach proposes tests of market structure to assess bank competition based on the Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) model. The SCP hypothesis argues that greater concentration causes less competitive bank conduct and leads to greater profitability of the bank.
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According to this, competition can be measured by concentration indices such as the market share of the largest banks, or by the Herfindahl index. These tools were widely applied until the 1990s.
The new empirical IO approach provides non-structural tests to circumvent the problems of the measures of competition provided by the traditional IO approach.
These latter measures suffer from the fact that they infer the degree of competition from indirect proxies such as market structure or market shares. In comparison, nonstructural measures do not infer the competitive conduct of banks through the analysis of market structure, but rather measure banks' conduct directly.
Following new empirical IO approach, we compute the Lerner index for each bank of our sample. The Lerner index has been computed in several recent studies on bank competition (e.g. Fernandez de Guevara, 2004, 2007; Martin, 7 This can lower performance in terms of social welfare because higher interest rates worsen the firm's incentives (Schnitzer, 1999 ).
Saurina and Salas, 2006). It is defined as the difference between the price and the marginal cost, divided by the price.
The price is computed by estimating the average price of bank production (proxied by total assets) as the ratio of total revenues to total assets, following Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004). The marginal cost is estimated on the basis of a translog cost function with one output (total assets) and three input prices (price of labor, price of physical capital, and price of borrowed funds). One cost function is estimated for each year to allow technology to change over time. We impose the restriction of linear homogeneity in input prices by normalizing total costs and input prices by one input price. The cost function is specified as follows:
where TC denotes total costs, y total assets, w 1 the price of labor (the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets) 8 , w 2 the price of physical capital (the ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed assets), w 3 the price of borrowed funds (the ratio of paid interests to all funding). Total costs are the sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest expenses and paid interest. The indices for each bank have been dropped from the presentation for the sake of simplicity. The estimated coefficients of the cost function are then used to compute the marginal cost.
III.3 Results
We now display the empirical results. As the explained variable, the presence of collateral, is a binary variable, we perform logit regressions following Jimenez, Salas 8 As Bankscope database does not provide information on the number of employees, we use this proxy variable for the price of labor following Fernandez de Guevara (2004, 2007 ). 14 1 Another source of skepticism might concern Dealscan database, which includes many syndicated loans. Consequently, the loan can be granted by a syndicate of banks from different countries, which might make hard to consider the degree of competition of one country as relevant to explain the use of collateral. However the investigation of the sample shows that a large number of banks involved in the syndicated loans are domestic banks. Without meaning that all lenders are domestic, it stresses the fact that bank competition at the domestic level clearly matters. From the perspective of syndicated loans practitioners (Fight, 2004) , the strong implication of domestic banks in syndicated loans is in line with on the one hand the fact that the arrangers are usually relationship banks, which are generally local banks with respect to the borrower's country (Esty, 2001 ), on the other hand the fact that the presence of local lenders reduces problems related to information asymmetries (Sufi, 2007 ).
Nevertheless we perform additional estimations to check whether our findings are dependent of the presence of syndicated loans. In this aim, we keep only single-lender loans, resulting in a strong reduction of the sample size. The loan sample then includes 1173 loans from 43 countries. The results of these estimations are reported in table 5. Once again, we find that bank competition exerts a positive and significant impact on the use of collateral. The only changes concern the significance of some country-level control variables. Therefore, in spite of the limitations of Dealscan database, these additional points support the relevance of our results.
Our findings have thus survived several robustness checks, leading to the strong support of our theoretical prediction that a loan is more likely to be secured if competition is lower in the banking industry.
IV. Concluding remarks
We investigate how bank competition influences the use of collateral. This question is of major interest to assess the implications of the structural changes of the banking industry on the access to bank finance, owing to the dependence of this access to collateral requirements. Since both banks demand the same repayment and the firms must incur some marginal application costs, firms apply for loans at the closest bank. As a result, both banks have the same market share. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:
We have to argue that banks have an incentive to offer the repayment S R .
Suppose that bank 1 deviates and demands ε R S − . Then it would make an expected loss with the marginal firm k. On top of that, it would attract all firms even those located further away. But for those firms the quality of the screening signal is lower. As a result, the expected loss would be even higher. Suppose that bank 1 deviates and demands ε R S + . Then all firms have an incentive to apply at the competing bank and bank 1 makes zero expected profits. (Problem: bank 2 would make a loss) Since both banks demand the same repayment and the firms must incur some marginal application costs, firms apply for loans at the closest bank. As a result, both banks have the same market share and the marginal firm k is located half-way between two banks. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1:
We have already derived the terms of the credit contracts provided that both banks offer the same type of contract. We still have to argue that it is an equilibrium that both banks offer the same contract.
Suppose bank 1 and bank 2 are located next to each other and both offer a collateralized contract because α is above the threshold value. Both banks make zero expected profit with the marginal borrower. What happens if bank 1 deviates and offers a screening contract? Since the screening contract is less attractive than the collateralized contract, all good firms would apply at bank 2. Only bad firms would find it attractive to apply at bank 1. This could be bad firms from the area around bank 1 and bank 2. Thus, all applicants at bank 1 would be bad firms. As a result, bank 2 does not have an incentive to deviate and offer a screening contract.
Next, suppose that bank 1 and bank 2 offer a screening contract because α is below the threshold value. What happens if bank 1 deviates and offers a collateralized contract? Since the collateralized contract is less attractive than the screening contract, all good firms would apply at bank 2 for a screening contract and get the loan because the signal is perfect. All bad firms would apply at bank 2 as well. Since bank 2 can observe the firm's location it could deny loans to firms that are located further away than the marginal firm k. Thus, given the contract terms bank 2 offered, it will still make zero expected profits. Bank 1 would lose all its customers. As a result, bank 1 does not have an incentive to deviate and offer a collateralized contract. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition
